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Purpose: The main goal of this thesis is to examine the share price effects of 
conducting seasoned equity offerings. Is the information asymmetry 
still the main explanation of the abnormal returns around the 
announcement day of SEOs? Do the firms experience long-term 
negative returns? 
Theoretical 
perspective: 
The study is based on previous research material applied on SEOs.  
Methodology A quantitative analysis is conducted for examining the difference 
between our sample categories regarding information asymmetry, 
abnormal returns and buy-and-hold long term returns. Statistical tests 
as well as an event study are performed.  
Empirical 
foundation: 
The analysis includes companies listed on the Swedish stock 
exchanges during the years 2006-2013. 
Conclusion: The results are similar to previous study. It appears that firms 
announcing SEOs do experience negative abnormal returns and also 
perform poorer than the market in the post-event period. The results 
direct that information asymmetry is a potent explanation of the 
abnormal returns.   
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Many of the publically traded corporations in today’s ever-changing economic environment 
rely heavily on their ability to raise capital through the issuance of new equity. This is one of 
the advantages of being a listed company however the outcome of issuing equity is often 
regarded as a negative sign by the market. There are many different motives for issuing 
securities, among those being to raise cash for capital expenditures and new investments, 
refinance or replace existing or maturing securities, change the firm’s capital structure, 
finance mergers and acquisitions, shift wealth and risk among bondholders and shareholders 
or simply to sustain the on-going operations of the firm. This information is stated in the 
prospectus that the firms build in connection to a seasoned equity offering (SEO). 
Nonetheless, when the news of the offering becomes public, issues of common stock on 
average generates negative abnormal return. The reasons behind these abnormal returns are 
well debated but popular explanations of the phenomena are based on information asymmetry. 
Researchers believe that management has a relatively higher level of private information prior 
to the announcement which leads to the price drop. In the United States, fully marketed 
traditional underwritten public offerings have been the most attractive SEO option among 
firms. But during the financial crisis in 2008 due to high level of market volatility, the public 
markets were closed to most issuers. When the economy later started to recover, firms in need 
of extra capital were advised to carefully raise funds through a variety of hybrid financing 
alternatives. Public equity transactions, registered direct offerings, at-the-market offerings and 
rights offerings being those hybrid alternatives. Rights offerings have existed for decades, but 
have never been a major source of external financing in the United States unlike in Europe 
and Asia, where it is a common procedure. From an issuer’s perspective, rights offerings in 
contrast to public offerings, requires no shareholder approval and hence rights offerings can 
be quickly processed and allows the issuer to take advantage of a window of opportunity or to 
solve liquidity issues. The rights offering can be underwritten so that the proceeds are secured 
by the firm. In such a case, an investment bank agrees to buy the remainder of the shares that 
has been not taken up by existing shareholders. However this is not always a good and safe 
option. Blue Arrow financed the purchase of Manpower with a rights issue in the United 
Kingdom in 1987. The rights issue was taken up by merely 37% of the existing shareholders, 
leaving the underwriter, National Westminster Bank, forced to buy up the remaining shares at 
a loss of almost 100 million pounds. But rights offerings are a cheaper source of financing 
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compared to its counterparts. It is less time consuming, shareholder approval is not required 
and the offers needs less marketing since it is made to current shareholders and not to the 
public. In 1988, Hansen provided evidence on why U.S firms tend to prefer the underwritten 
public offerings to the underwritten rights offerings, quote: “…public offerings may be 
preferable to rights offerings, despite the extra underwriting fees, because underwriters are 
able to sell new common stock at higher prices off the exchanges than stockholders can 
across exchanges.”12  
From a shareholder’s perspective, rights offerings allows existing shareholders to make 
further investment in the firm at a discounted price along with the ability to avoid being 
diluted. However, Tanya Jefferies wrote an article around rights issues stating: “Shareholders 
don’t like rights issues. Any company that gives its investors the unwelcome choice between 
stumping up more cash or seeing their existing holding diluted can expect to take a significant 
hit to its stock”.  The reasons behind a rights issue can be fairly nonthreatening for example 
using the proceeds to finance promising investments, but can also be the last alternative to 
avoid bankruptcy. So what options does an investor have when the company announces a 
rights issue? In a general case, the shareholders are offered to buy shares in context of what 
number of shares they currently hold. For example, owning two shares allows one to buy one 
additional share. So one can take up all of the rights, or sell some of the rights and take up the 
rest, or one can sell all of the rights. The second alternative allows the investor to come out 
even on the deal if he or she sells enough rights to cover the costs of the ones he or she buys 
also called tail swallowing. The last option is to ignore the rights completely, and then the 
offer will run out on deadline.
3
  
According to previous research by the well-known authors, Myer and Majluf, 
companies always prefer internal financing to security issues. When companies then do end 
up issuing securities the issuance of bond is preferable to the issuance of equity which could 
explain the negative reaction by the market. On the Swedish market, the dominant type of a 
SEO is a rights offering. This thesis will examine the announcement effect and the post-event 
                                                          
1
 Beck, Melissa, “Frequently asked questions about rights offerings”, Genus: Capital Markets Group of Morrison 
& Foerster LLP, 2010, pp. 1-8 
2
 Hansen ,Robert S., “The demise of the rights issue”, Genus: The review of financial studies, no 3, 1988, pp. 
289-309 
3
 Jefferies, Tanya, “How to survive a rights issue: As Barclays cash call deadline looms, what are investors’ 
options?”, Genus: This is MONEY.co.uk, 2013 
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effect of rights offerings on the Swedish market. The methods used will be comparable to 
previous research conducted on the U.S market.
4
  
 
1.2 Problem discussion 
The thesis explores the potential information asymmetry regarding the announcement of 
rights offerings and also explores the post-event effects of these issues. The infrequent use of 
rights offerings on the U.S market, where most of the existing literature originates, makes the 
authors uncertain whether the theories are representative, especially since different markets 
seem to observe different results. Information asymmetry appear to be the only consistent 
explanation of the abnormal returns around SEOs, however this study will also consider other 
potential explanations. Previous studies provide evidence for abnormal announcement day 
price drops for a SEO, and especially for rights offerings. Rights offerings, as aforementioned, 
give the shareholders the option to keep their stake in the company, usually with a discount 
compared to current market price. So when considering the market value of the company after 
a rights offering, 𝑉, when you have the original value, 𝑉′, and the subscription payments, 𝑆 
the new market value will be: 
𝑉 = 𝑉′ + 𝑆 
The price per share will fall since you originally have 𝑛 shares, and then ad 𝑚 shares that 
have been offered at discount: 
(𝑉′ + 𝑆)
(𝑛 + 𝑚)
<
𝑉′
𝑛
 
This price drop should in a perfect world equal the market value of the rights and the effects 
in this world would be exactly the same as that of a stock split, and thus the shareholders 
wealth would be unaffected. So when observing share price effects of rights offerings, one 
should assume the prices to drop even without information asymmetry. However, this should 
affect the price directly after the actual issuance, not on the announcement day of the rights 
offerings, which in instead should have a negative effect on the share price following the 
announcement of a rights offering.
5
  
A right offering that is not fully subscribed leaves the shareholders that did not buy 
additional shares diluted. The dilution effect depending on how many additional shares for 
                                                          
4
 Myers, Steve & Majluf Nicholas S.,”Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have 
information that investors do not have”, Genus:Journal of financial economics 13, nr 1, 1984, pp.187-221   
5
 Smith Jr., Clifford W., “Alternative methods for raising capital”, Genus: Journal of financial economics 5, no 1, 
1977, pp. 273-307   
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every existing share offered. If the terms end up being very expensive for the shareholders 
they ought to not exercise their rights which potentially could affect the performance of the 
company. The relative size of the rights offering, (injected capital if fully subscribed/market 
capitalization) is also considered a potential explanatory variable because if the need of 
external capital is relatively large, and the proceeds is not used for new investment, one may 
well believe that the firm is close to financial distress which could therefore also affect the 
value of the company. Furthermore, categorizing  the sample with small and large firms are a 
common feature of similar studies, and categorizing the companies through the use of the 
proceeds whether it is for growth opportunities or mainly for survival will enable 
supplementary conclusive results.  
The previous research included in the thesis is relatively old. Although this is the case 
and to the authors knowledge, it is still the best suited comparative research material that 
exists. These studies have been examined, verified and some of them are being used in current 
student literature, which substantiates their importance. The methodology of the thesis is also 
based on these older studies. The analysis and conclusion of this paper will either support or 
reject the empirical evidence of the older data and determine if the economic environment has 
changed within the playing field of rights issues. Comparing the results in this study will also 
show the differences in information asymmetry between research done today and research 
done several years ago. This may perhaps explain whether the gap of information between 
management and shareholders has decreased given the superior flow of information in today’s 
market.  
 
1.3 Purpose of the thesis and research questions 
The purpose of this study is to further examine the announcement effects and long-term 
effects of firms conducting rights offerings. As aforementioned, most of the previous research 
is done on the U.S. market and by applying a similar methodology on Swedish data we expect 
to bring some new angles related to rights offering theories. Most of the previous research 
only examines either the announcement effect or the long-term effect, this thesis will use a 
broader perspective and examine both of these. The announcement effect is examined to 
estimate the information asymmetry on the Swedish stock market and the long-term effect 
will show the performance of the stock which could be of interest from an investor’s 
perspective. The three main questions this thesis will attempt to answer are the following:  
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 Do firms that conduct a SEO experience negative abnormal returns on and around the 
day the SEO is announced? 
 Do firms that conduct a SEO suffer long-term negative returns over a one-year period 
post the announcement of the SEO? 
 Which variables could explain these potential abnormal returns and to what 
magnitude? 
1.4 Thesis outline 
The thesis is divided into three different segments: 
The first part examines the abnormal returns over the event window, using the market 
model to calculate the expected normal return. The event window starts three days prior to the 
event and ends three days following the event. In addition, the thesis examines shorter event 
windows for supplementary results and analysis.  
The second part attempts to explain the abnormal returns using a multiple regression. 
Several hypotheses created the explanatory variables. The results will show the effects of 
these variables and how significantly they explain the abnormal returns.  
The third part observes the post-issue stock price performance during a one-year period 
past the announcement of the SEO, the abnormal return will be calculated using the buy-and-
hold abnormal return (BHAR) approach. 
Chapter two will describe the important theories in corporate finance regarding 
seasoned equity offerings as well as describe the previous research within the subject. Chapter 
three will go through the methodology, explaining the different calculations, metrics and tests. 
The chapter will also thoroughly describe why some of the data was excluded and how it was 
treated. In chapter four we will present our results and discuss these results in context of the 
theories and previous research described in chapter two. Finally chapter five will consist of 
our final thoughts, conclusions and will also present suggestions for further research. 
 
1.5 Delimitation of thesis 
This thesis will cover SEOs conducted by companies listed in Sweden during the period 
November 2006 to December 2013. Selection criteria’s for the sample will be presented in the 
methodology chapter. 
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2. Literature review and development of hypotheses 
2.1 Process of security offerings 
IPOs and SEOs, public offers and private placements, regular shares and preferred shares, 
domestic issues and global issues, stock options and convertible debt, all of which are part of 
the exciting world of security offerings. These different types of security offerings have 
different outcomes and theoretical background and are issued for different reasons. A short 
description of the different methods of seasoned equity offerings will be described further in 
detail:
6
 
 
General public offerings 
In a general public offering of seasoned equity, a publicly traded firm sells additional shares 
to the public, i.e. all investors in the market are welcomed to participate in the SEO. The firm 
hires investment bankers to underwrite the issue, the underwriter is chosen by the firm’s 
manager either by negotiation or competitive bidding. The underwriter then examines the 
financial status of the firm, also called the due diligence process, registers the issue with 
national financial supervisory authority, and presents key investors and clients to an 
introductory prospectus. When the financial inspection has approved the issue, the 
underwriter sets the final offer price and the following day, bidding starts. This is historically 
a common SEO option often applied in the U.S. and is called a fully-marketed offer. There is 
also another form of a public offering that is called an accelerated offer. Accelerated 
bookbuild offers and bought deal offers are two subcategories of accelerated offers. The key 
difference of  the subcategories and a fully-marketed offer is that the process of the 
accelerated offers are far less time consuming and the trading begins within 48 hours of the 
announcement. In the European market, the accelerated offers are today far more common 
than fully-marketed offers.
7
 
 
Private placement 
In a private placement the firm sells all the shares to one single investor or a small group of 
investors (smaller than the total number of shareholders). In 1989, K.H. Wruck analyzes how 
private placements affect firm value. She concludes that in her sample, the announcement of a 
private sale of equity increases shareholder wealth by on average 4.5%. Wruck argues that the 
                                                          
6
 Ogden, Joseph P., Jen ,Frank C. & O’Connor, Philip F., Advanced Corporate Finance (1), Prentice Hall, 2002 
7
 Eckbo, B. Espen, Masulis, Ronald W. & Norli, Oyvind, “Security offerings”, Genus: Handbook of Corporate 
finance vol 1, 2007, Ch. 6 
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increase in wealth (which is significantly higher in her study compared to studies made on 
general public offerings) depends on the ownership concentration, since private sale generally 
increases the ownership concentration of a firm. She further finds that dominant blockholders 
increases their voting power while management reduces their voting power on average 
following a private placement. The offers are, like public offerings, discounted however 
Herzel and Smith found in their study that private placements are sold at a 20% discount 
compared to public offering.
89
 
 
Rights offering 
In a rights offering the current shareholders of the firm are given (issued) so called preemptive 
rights, these rights are short-term warrants that can be exercised to buy new stocks in the 
SEO. The exercise price is generally set to a discount of the current market price of the stock, 
which is done to make it costly for the current shareholder not to exercise their rights. The 
rights offering method gives the current shareholders an opportunity to prevent the dilution 
effect, i.e. the reduction in their proportional stake of the company which would occur if there 
was a general public offering. If the shareholder does not wish to participate in the SEO he or 
she can sell the rights in a secondary market.
10
 
 
Stock and stock option grants 
The SEO might include different types of securities; it could include primary shares, 
secondary shares, preferred share or units. Preferred shares are shares that have other features 
than the common shares, a preferred stock might for example have preference in dividends 
and preference in assets if the company would be liquidated. A unit offering gives the investor 
the opportunity to buy one unit, the unit include a number of shares and some number of 
options/warrants, the unit offering might mitigate the free cash flow problem since the 
included options might be exercised later and therefore contribute capital at some later stage 
in time.
11
 
 
                                                          
8
 Wruck, Karen Hopper, ”Equity ownership concentration and firm value, evidence from private equity 
financings”, Genus: Journal of financial economics 23,nr 1, 1989, pp. 3-28 
9
 Ogden et. Al. (2002) 
10
 Ogden et. Al. (2002) 
11
 Ogden et. Al. (2002) 
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2.2 Why issue equity? 
There are several different reasons for a firm to conduct a seasoned equity offering (SEO). Let 
us say that the management of a firm has decided to finance a new capital investment program 
with a mix of debt and equity. In this situation, the probability of undertaking a SEO depends 
on the company’s ability to generate healthy internal cash flow through existing projects that 
can finance new investments. Because if the internal equity funds are insufficient, the firm has 
to either withdraw from the new capital investment program or raise external funding. 
Therefore one should expect a positive correlation between the number of investment 
opportunities of a firm and the profitability of its existing projects. However, there are some 
exceptions to this rule; firms that has profitable existing projects does not necessarily have 
profitable investment opportunities; firms that has profitable existing projects and profitable 
investment opportunities might have investment outlays that exceeds the internal funds; and 
also firms might have no existing projects but have plenty of profitable investment 
opportunities. 
When the need of external financing is identified by the management of a firm a 
proposal is presented to the directors of the board who must approve of the issuance. If the 
security offering involves authorized shares, the shareholders must also approve before 
moving forward in the process.
12
 
 
2.3 Information asymmetry 
In a perfect world, the flow of information related to all company activities would be 
transferred instantly from managers to the market. In economic environment, companies 
would be accurately priced. However, this is rarely the case for any companies. In a world of 
information asymmetry, managers and the market are only assumed to be equally well 
informed about market-wide information, which means that both groups are exposed to 
market-wide uncertainty. But around all kinds of firm-specific information, managers know 
more than the market. This level of information asymmetry is high when managers receive a 
relatively high flow of such information. In the end, such information will be transferred to 
the public, either through a press release or simply through the passage of time, which 
consequently lowers the information asymmetry between management and the market. 
Nathalie Dierkens studied the subject and related it to equity issue announcements. She found 
that equity issue announcements are favored by managers when information asymmetry is 
                                                          
12
 Ogden et. Al. (2002) 
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low. Her results showed that an increased information asymmetry prior to the issue 
announcement lead to an increased price-drop at the issue date. Myers and Majluf published 
their paper in 1984 and determined that if managers have superior information and the firm is 
issuing stock to finance an investment, stock price will fall all other things equal. 
1314
 
 
2.4 The Pecking order hypothesis 
Stewart C. Myers (1984) provided a modified version of the pecking order theory in 1980, 
which was originally developed by Gordon Donaldson in 1960, that examines and explains 
the financial behavior of managers which is an important aspect to contemplate when 
analyzing equity issues. In his paper, Myers examines the static tradeoff story and asserts that 
the theory does work to some extent, but that the empirical results have unacceptably low r-
squared values. To improve the model, Myers bases the theory on asymmetric information. 
Then, by adding the empirically supported elements from the static tradeoff story, the 
modified pecking order is created.  Even though Myers himself says that his modified version 
is grossly oversimplified and underqualified, the theory has come to play a vital part in the 
subject of corporate finance.  
In his theory, Myers argues that managers seem to prefer internal financing to external 
financing that is using retained earnings instead of funds raised from the debt- or equity-
market.  When firms do raise external capital the managers prefer the least risky alternative 
which is the security that is the closest to the default risk-free rate. Therefore, issuing debt is 
preferable to issuing equity since issuing debt is closer to the default risk-free rate. Firms’ 
pecking order in terms of financing can be found below.
15
 
                                                          
13
 Myers, Steve & Majluf Nicholas S.,”Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have 
information that investors do not have”, Genus:Journal of financial economics 13, nr 1, 1984, pp.187-221   
14
  Dierkens, Nathalie, “Information asymmetry and quantitative analysis”, Genus: The journal of financial and 
quantitative analysis, No 2, 1991, pp. 181-199   
15
 Myers, Stewart C., “Capital structure puzzle”, Genus: Journal of finance vol. 39, 1984, pp. 575-592 
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Figure 1- Pecking order hypothesis 
Myers modified version of the pecking order was later formulated into a theoretical 
model by Myers and Majluf in 1984 where the corporate financing behavior was explained as 
a consequence of asymmetric information. Myers and Majluf enlighten the common tendency 
that firms that announce a SEO typically receive a negative reaction from the market. One 
important finding is that firms are better off going to the bond market for external capital than 
financing by issuing equity, which is consistent with Myers argument in the previous section. 
A firm that have investment opportunities with positive net present values but that does not 
have enough internally generated funds, and that have no possibility of using low-risk debt, 
should give up the investment rather than to issue equity according to their conclusion. They 
argue that the expected decline in firm value increases with the size of the equity issue, 
however simulations indicates that the decline in firm value is reduced when the uncertainty 
of the value of the firm’s assets is reduced. 16 
 
2.5 Efficient market hypothesis 
The efficient-market hypothesis (EMH), developed by Eugene Fama, addresses the effects of 
competition in financial markets on security prices. The EMH assumes that the ideal capital 
market exists which assumes that the following assumptions are met
17
: 
 Assumption 1: Capital markets are frictionless 
 Assumption 2: All market participants share homogenous expectations 
 Assumption 3: All market participants are atomistic 
 Assumption 4: The firm’s investment program is fixed and known 
 Assumption 5: The firm´s financing is fixed 
                                                          
16
 Myers, Steve & Majluf Nicholas S.,”Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have 
information that investors do not have”, Genus:Journal of financial economics 13, nr 1, 1984, pp.187-221   
17
 Ogden et. Al. (2002) 
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The efficient market hypothesis claims that a security´s market price, at all times reflect the 
true value of the security, meaning that the security is fairly priced. Rational investors use all 
the available information that is value-relevant to determine the following points: 
 The security´s expected future cash flows 
 The riskiness of these cash flows 
 The appropriate discount rate to apply to the security´s expected cash flows 
Fama specified three different forms of market efficiency, weak form, semi strong form and 
strong form.  
Weak form efficiency 
Securities reflect the information contained in historical price patterns, i.e. an investor would 
not be able to base the investment decision by analyzing graphs of historical prices (technical 
analysis would not work if the market was weak). 
Semi-strong-form efficiency 
If the market is semi strong, a security´s price would reflect all the publicly available 
information, thus the share price of a company is reflected by the annual reports, quarterly 
reports, SEO announcement, macroeconomic news etcetera and the information is discounted 
in the share price instantly. In the semi strong form of market efficiency all the criterions of 
the weak form are met.  
Strong-form efficiency 
If the market is strong form efficient, the prices are reflected by all information, both public 
news and inside information (privately held information). Consequently it is not possible to 
earn any excess returns even by using inside information. In the strong form of market 
efficiency all the criterions of the weak- and semi-strong-form are met.
18
 
 
2.6 Signaling theory 
In a world where all information is available to everyone there is no reason for managers to 
send signals to existing and future investors. However opposed to Eugene Fama and other 
fans of the efficient market hypothesis, the signaling theory believes that information 
asymmetry exists. Barclay and Litzenberger describe three different signaling hypotheses 
related to the issuance of equity. 
19
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 Fama, Eugene F., “Efficient capital markets: A review of theory and empirical work”, Genus: The journal of 
finance vol. 25, Nr 2, 1970, pp. 383-417 
19
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The existing asset value signaling hypothesis 
The existing asset value signaling hypothesis is roughly based on Myers and Majluf article 
from 1984, mentioned earlier in this chapter. The hypothesis is built on the idea that insiders 
in a firm have more and better information regarding the value of the firm’s and of the value 
of its assets compared to the shareholders. When firms have investment opportunities and 
lacks sufficient working capital, the management of the firm should conduct a SEO only if 
they believe that the current market value of the company exceeds its intrinsic value. Thus if a 
firm conduct a SEO it has a negative impact on the stock price and vice versa for debt. The 
intended use of the injected capital, whether it is for a positive-net present value investment or 
for survival has no impact on the magnitude of the price drop for the stock. 
 
The cash flow signaling hypothesis 
The cash flow signaling hypothesis is obtained from Miller and Rock (1985)
20
. The 
hypothesis assumes that the current internal cash flow for a firm is not known for all investors 
but that the value of the firm´s assets is known to all, conditional on the current cash flow, 
thus asymmetric information regarding the current cash flow but symmetric regarding the 
value on the assets given a special level of the cash flow. An unexpected announcement of the 
need for external capital would therefore send negative signals since the markets 
interpretation would be that the firm lacks the ability to generate sufficient internal cash flow. 
In this hypothesis it would not matter whether the firm issued debt or equity, the signal would 
be the same and thus the negative reaction would be the same, the size of the reaction would 
be related to the size of the issue.  
 
The wasteful investment hypothesis 
The hypothesis is related to the work of Berle and Means (1932) and Jensen (1986) and his 
free cash flow hypothesis. It is based on agency theory and more specifically that managers 
have a tendency to overinvest and accept non-positive net present value investments (NPV). If 
firms announce the need for external capital the signal to the market would be a higher level 
of planned investments. If the NPV of this investment is negative the stock price will fall, 
regardless if the firm issues debt or equity.
21
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2.7 Previous studies 
Hansen (1988) investigates the differences between underwritten public offerings and 
underwritten/non-underwritten rights offerings. In the article Hansen presents direct evidence 
on why firms in the U.S. tend to prefer the underwritten public offering to rights offerings. He 
found that rights offerings clearly have lower floatation costs than underwritten public 
offerings, but are also associated with a price drop prior to the sale, and then a price recovery 
thereafter. The rights offerings had statistically significant abnormal returns during the 
announcement day, 20 days presubscription period and 20 days post subscription period for 
both utility and industrial companies. Although the abnormal returns during the post-
subscription period was positive. 
22
 
Ngatuni, Capstaff and Marshall in 2007 examined the long-run stock performance 
following rights offerings in the UK for the period 1986-1995 and a smaller sample of open 
offers in the period 1991-1995. The performance is measured in 1,3 and 5-year periods using 
a buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) model where the issuing firm is matched with a non-
issuing firm. They found that in their sample more than 63% of the issuing firms’ experienced 
negative post-announcement abnormal returns. Their hypothesis of zero post-announcement 
abnormal return was rejected at the 1%-level.
23
     
In 1977, Smith examined the choice of method for raising equity capital where he 
compares rights offerings and underwritten public offerings. Smith concludes that if the rights 
offering is properly constructed the proceeds is equivalent to the underwritten public offering. 
Estimations of the expenses however indicate that the out-of-pocket costs are lower for the 
rights offering method.
24
  
Tim Loughran and Jay R. Ritter published an article in 1995 that studied initial public 
offerings and seasoned equity offerings between the years of 1970 to 1990 and found that the 
companies significantly underperform relative to nonissuing firms for five years after the date 
of event. The companies that had done a SEO performed slightly better than the “IPO-
companies”, reaching annual returns of 7% compared to 5%.25  
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Paul Asquith and David W. Mullins, Jr investigated the effect of equity issue on stock 
prices and published their article in 1986. They found out that the announcement of common 
equity offerings, in fact, 80% of their sample of industrial issues have abnormal negative 
announcement day returns. Two years prior to the issue the sample companies outperform the 
market by an average of 33%, but following the event the firms underperform the market by 
6%.
26
  
Mark D. Walker and Keven Yost published an article in 2008 about SEO’s. They 
divided the issues into groups depending on what the management’s stated intentions were for 
the expected inflow of capital. They found that providing specific information related to the 
SEO matters and increases value at the announcement day. In contrast to previous sentence, 
firms that provide vague information related to the SEO have losses at the announcement day. 
Their finding therefore supported the view that agency issues have a significant impact on 
SEOs.
27
  
Nathalie Dierkens examined in 1991 the relevance of information asymmetry for the 
equity issue process. The sample data comprised 197 industrial firms that had done seasoned 
primary equity issues between 1980 and 1983. Her results also supported the view that 
information asymmetry have significant negative impact at the announcement day of the 
issue, 80% of the samples abnormal returns were negative.
28
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Table 1- Previous studies 
2.8 Critique against the literature 
Theories within business administration and economics are not scientific facts, we cannot say 
that the pecking order theory is the true theory that describes the behavior of firms with the 
same certainty as that the earth is round or that one plus one equals two. But as the time 
passes by and the theories are being tested and fail to be rejected they become some kind of 
consensus. However there is a great divergence between researchers which is described by 
Leary and Roberts (2009), as they write in their article:  
“Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) conclude that the pecking order is a good descriptor 
of broad financing patterns; Frank and Goyal (2003) conclude the opposite. Lemmon and 
Zender (2004) conclude that a ‘‘modified’’ pecking order—which takes into account financial 
distress costs—is a good descriptor of financing behavior; Fama and French (2005) conclude 
the opposite. Frank and Goyal (2003) conclude that the pecking order better describes the 
behavior of large firms, as opposed to small firms; Fama and French (2005) conclude the 
opposite.
29
 
                                                          
29
 Leary, Mark T. & Roberts, Michael R., “The pecking order, debt capacity, and information asymmetry”, 
Genus: Journal of financial economics 95, no 1, 2010, pp. 332-355 
Writer(s) Year Type of SEO Sample Result
Rights Offering
Rights Offering
IPO/SEO
102 firms1963-1985
1986-1995
1970-1990
1997, 2000
Robert S. Hansen
Proches Ngatuni, John 
Capstaff & Andrew 
Marshall
Tim Loughran & Jay R. 
Ritter
Paul Asquith & David W. 
Mullins, Jr
Mark D. Walker & Keven 
Yost
1963-1981 Public Offerings 531 Public offerings
Significant abnormal negative announcement day returns. 
Underperform the market by 6% two years post-issue
Nathalie Dierkens
589 firms
3702 SEO's
Negative statistically signficant abnormal returns 20 days 
prior to the issue, however significantly positive returns 20 
days postsubscription period.
Substantial negative abnormal returns for 1,3 and 5-year 
periods
Significantly underperforming relative to nonissuing firms for 
5-year post-issue
Public Offerings 438 firms
 Abnormal negative two-day announcement returns for the 
sample. Firms that issue for investment opportunities have 
less negative reaction than other issues. 
1980-1983 Public OFferings 197 firms
80% of the sample had  abnormal negative two-day  
announcement returns. Results shows that firms announce 
equity issue when information assymetry is low.
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Most of the previous research is done in the US where public offerings are the most common 
issuing method compared to our study that will consist only of firms using the rights offering 
method. This might affect the results which must be carefully analyzed before drawing any 
conclusions. Most of the previous research included in this paper consists of considerably 
older data most of which are done between the years 1960-2000. Comparing the market in the 
1960´s to the market today one ought to believe that the information asymmetry was greater 
in 1970 because of the today’s greater flow of information.  
That is why we need to have a critical view on the theories and test whether these 
theories actually can be applied to our set of data. This leads us in to our hypotheses. 
 
 2.9 Development of hypotheses  
Previous studies established evidence of significant abnormal returns around the 
announcement day of the SEOs. There are many different possible factors that could explain 
the results, overvaluation of firms conducting SEOs, the size of the company or information 
asymmetry between shareholders and management to name a few. Although most of these 
studies examined public offerings on the U.S market, the research expects similar results for 
rights offerings on the Swedish market. Consequently the following hypothesis is created: 
 
Hypothesis 1 
𝐻0: Rights offerings do not have negative abnormal returns around the 
announcement day 
𝐻1: Rights offerings have negative abnormal returns around the announcement day 
 
As aforementioned, Ngatuni’s paper and Loughter and Ritters paper examined the post-
issue performance for their sample of firms. The results pointed out that a large portion of 
their firms performed significantly worse than non-issuing firms for up to five years after the 
issuance. These finding leads to the formulation of the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2 
𝐻0: Rights offerings do not have negative abnormal returns in the post-issue period. 
𝐻1: Rights offerings have negative abnormal returns in the post-issue period. 
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The importance of information asymmetry regarding the process of issuing new equity is 
known and previously studied. Managers generally have more information and therefore an 
advantage over the market in predicting firm-specific events. Theories predict that an 
announcement of a SEO reveals negative information about a company and will therefore 
result in a drop in market value of a company. Empirical evidence supports these theories, 
indicating that information asymmetry is the cause of the stock price reactions in connection 
to the announcement of a SEO. Furthermore, information asymmetry seems to fluctuate over 
time and Nathalie Dierkens concluded that the greater the information asymmetry is the 
greater will the drop in share price be at the equity issue announcement.
30
 Assuming that 
larger firms are more analysed by banks and investors the information asymmetry should be 
less for larger firms than smaller. As a result of the above evidence and assumptions the third 
hypothesis is: 
 
Hypothesis 3 
𝐻0: Small firms do not perform worse than large firms around the announcement 
day of a rights offering. 
𝐻1: Small firms perform worse than large firms around the announcement day of a 
rights offering. 
 
The flotation costs of issuing new shares are made up of direct costs and indirect costs. 
The direct costs include underwriter compensation, registration and listing fees, legal, 
accounting and printing expenses etc. The underwriters’ main compensation is the difference 
between the public offering price and the underwriter purchase price, but they also get 
reimbursed if there is an overallotment option. Overallotment option is when the underwriters 
allow the issuing firm to issue more shares than what was intended initially and can be 
exercised within 30 days of the offering. The indirect costs is typically the underpricing costs 
as the security often is sold at a discount relative to its prior trading day’s closing price and its 
closing market price immediately following the public offering. However this thesis mainly 
focuses on rights offerings and therefore is the underpricing costs irrelevant because only the 
existing shareholders are offered the new shares. Another indirect cost that is considered 
significant yet hard to quantify are the costs of management time devoted to the offering 
process.  As mentioned, C.W Smith Jr conducted a study in 1977 comparing the costs of 
                                                          
30
 Dierkens, Nathalie, “Information asymmetry and quantitative analysis”, Genus: The journal of financial and 
quantitative analysis, No 2, 1991, pp. 181-199   
   18 
 
public offerings versus rights offering and found that rights offerings are significantly cheaper 
and perform overall better than public offerings. Robert S. Hansen studied rights issues 
between1963-1983 on the U.S. market and found that these firms had very low costs 
associated with the rights issues but argued that the benefit of using the more expensive 
underwriters exceeded the cost difference.  This thesis examines whether the cheaper rights 
offerings perform better than the more expensive rights offerings, which generated the 
following hypothesis:
3132
 
 
Hypothesis 4 
𝐻0: Companies with low issuance costs do not perform better than those with high 
issuance costs. 
𝐻1: Companies with low issuance costs perform better than those with high issuance 
costs. 
 
Among the different firms of the data set there is a wide range of different ownership 
dilution effects that comes with the issuance. If existing shareholder does not exercise his or 
her rights, their company stake will be diluted, the size of the dilution depending on how 
many shares the company is issuing. This paper examines whether these dilution effects have 
an impact on the outcome of the post-event period that lead to the development of the 
following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 5 
𝐻0: Companies with issuances that have minor dilution impacts do not perform 
better than those with major dilution impacts. 
𝐻1: Companies with issuances that have minor dilution impacts perform better than 
those with major dilution impacts. 
 
In the prospects of the rights offerings the reasons behind the need of new capital was 
stated. Firms tend to not explain these reasons in a specific way but it is always stated if the 
cash proceedings were not sufficient enough for the on-going operations over the next twelve 
months. These issues are reckoned as survival issues, which mean that without the injected 
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capital the company would eventually go bankrupt. However, the companies that declared 
that the proceedings were being used for new investment projects such as buying new 
technology or acquisitions was categorized as growth opportunity issues. The following 
hypothesis is used for distinguishing any difference in the performance between the two 
categories. 
 
Hypothesis 6 
𝐻0: Companies that made issues mainly for growth opportunities do not perform 
better than those that made issues mainly for survival. 
𝐻1: Companies that made issues mainly for growth opportunities perform better than 
those that made issues mainly for survival 
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3. Methodology 
3.1 Data  
3.1.1 Data collection 
To find the relevant information for the thesis, the primary data is collected from the firm’s 
own prospects retrieved from Finansinspektionens prospect register. This is a digital 
newsroom that contains, among other things, information about equity issuances on the 
Swedish market. In the procedure to get the SEOs all prospects had to be reviewed in order to 
find the prospects needed for this study. Once all the issuances were quantified, additional 
information regarding the SEOs and firms were retrieved from the prospects..  
The financial information about the companies that made issues is collected from 
Thomson Reuters Datastream. The study comprises 100 days share prices prior to the event 
window, 7 days share prices during the event window and 252 share prices following the 
event. Market capitalization for each of the companies is also collected through Thomson 
Reuters Datastream.  
The data consists of 253 SEOs from companies listed on the Swedish stock exchanges 
in the period 1
st
 of November 2006 to 31
st
 of December 2013, the timespan is chosen since the 
study need ±1 year of data post/prior the announcement day and the prospectus register at 
Finansinpektionen contains prospectus from November 2006. This time-period is applicable 
because it covers both up- and downswings in the economic environment. During the 
recession in 2008 and 2009 a lot of companies were under financial distress which influenced 
the issuance of equity during this period of time.  
The SEO’s is classified into different categories, type of SEO, injected capital if fully 
subscribed, costs, dilution and then whether the issuance was made for growth opportunities 
or simply for survival. Most of the SEOs on the Stockholm Stock Exchange are rights 
offerings where existing shareholders have the right to buy additional shares to be able to 
maintain their proportionate stake in the company.  
 
3.1.2 Data sources 
The respective data is retrieved from the following sources: 
 Thomson Reuters – Datastream: Share Prices (P)and Market capitalization 
 Finansinspektionen:  Security equity offerings prospects 
 Avanza: Company press releases 
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The thesis primarily uses literatures covered in courses taught at Lund University, for 
previous empirical studies, relevant journal articles and e-books the authors found the Lund 
University Library database very resourceful.   
 
3.1.3 Selection criteria’s and sample 
Going through all the prospects at finansinspektionens prospect register where all different 
kind of prospects is found, a total of 253 SEOs were done in the period November 2006 to 
December 2013. Selection criteria’s were set up to get SEOs and firms that were as close as 
possible to previous research. The selection criteria´s are: 
1. By the time of the issuance the company has to be listed on NASDAQ OMX 
Stockholm or at Aktietorget. 
2. The issuing company has to be listed at least one year prior to the event and one year 
following the event, in addition to this the company are only allowed to conduct one 
SEO within the 2-year period.  
3. Daily share price information needs to be available on Thomson Reuters Datastream 
for the whole period of interest. 
4. The firm needs to receive cash in context of the issuance.  
5. The motive of the issuance needs to be stated. 
6. The SEO must be a common stock-only offering, SEOs offering preferred shares or 
units are excluded.  
7. Market capitalization threshold of 100MSEK, firms with lower market cap is not 
included. 
The market capitalization requirement is set to eliminate data with unusual share price 
behavior since smaller companies share prices usually fluctuate differently because of less 
liquidity and larger spreads. The requirement for only one SEO within the 2-year period is set 
to avoid any estimation biases in the estimation of the normal return, if this requirement is 
violated the expected normal return would be biased due to unusual share price behavior in 
the estimation window and thus give incorrect estimates of the abnormal returns.     
Applying the selection criteria’s to the 253 SEOs left a total of 99 SEOs in the sample, 56 of 
the SEOs was not included due to a market cap lower than 100 MSEK and 98 was not 
included due to the other reasons in the criteria’s mentioned earlier.   
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Figure 2- Sample of SEOs 
 
3.1.4 Selectivity bias 
Analysis based on data where a big share of the total sample is not included in the final 
sample is known as selectivity bias. Think of a survey where 50% answer the survey and 50% 
do not, the analysis on the answer from the 50% may not fully reflect the behavior of the last 
50% that did not answer the questions.
33
 In this thesis the selectivity bias might occur due to a 
number of SEOs that is not included in the final sample, the firms not included could possibly 
behave differently than those included and thus the final results might have been different if 
these were included. However the reason to set up the criteria´s on which SEOs should be 
included is done to get a sample that is as close as possible to the previous research within the 
subject.  
 
3.1.5 Survivorship bias 
Criterion two in the sample section says that firms that aren’t listed on a stock exchange ±1 
year from the announcement day are not included in the final sample. This criterion might 
induce a survivorship bias in the results. Survivorship bias might occur when stocks, mutual 
funds or other securities are excluded in a sample due to the lack of data during the period of 
interest. This bias can create problems when doing a research, mutual funds that disappears 
tend to do so because of poor performance and stocks that disappear usually do this because 
of bankruptcy. Therefore excluding these tend to lead to an overestimation of the 
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performance.
34
 In this study there are some SEOs excluded due to missing data, however the 
vast majority of the SEOs not included are due to other reasons and therefore the survivorship 
bias is not expected to be a significant problem. 
    
3.2 Event study 
In order to check for the effect on stock price regarding firms that announces that they will 
conduct an SEO, the event study method will be used. To conduct an event study the 
following steps are followed, as suggested by MacKinlay in 1997:
35
 
 
3.2.1 Define the event of interest and identify the event window 
The event of interest is the announcement day of the seasoned equity offering, the event 
window is defined as ± 3 days before/after the announcement day, i.e. the event window is 
seven days.  
 
3.2.2 Determine the selection criteria of a given firm 
The selection criteria’s can be found in chapter 3.1.3. 
 
3.2.3 Event impact – Measurement of the normal return 
There are a number of ways to calculate the normal return, both statistical and economic 
approaches. Perhaps two of the most common models are the constant mean return model 
which assumes that the normal return is the mean and a disturbance term and the market 
model.  
The market model is a statistical model, which compare the returns of a security to the 
return of the market portfolio and is chosen as measurement of the abnormal returns. The 
model is potentially better than the constant mean return model since by excluding part of the 
return that is related to the variation in the markets return, the variance of the excess return is 
reduced. The benchmark chosen for the estimations of the normal return is the OMXSPI 
which is a weighted index among the 298 listed companies on the Stockholm stock 
exchange.
36
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Ordinary least squares are a reliable estimation technique for the market model 
parameters. The OLS estimators for the market model parameters in this event study are as 
follows: 
?̂?𝑖 =
∑ (𝑅𝑖𝜏 − ?̂?𝑖)(𝑅𝑚𝜏 − ?̂?𝑚
𝑇1
𝜏=𝑇0+1
∑ (𝑅𝑚𝜏 − ?̂?𝑚)2
𝑇1
𝜏=𝑇0+1
 
?̂?𝑖 = ?̂?𝑖 − ?̂?𝑖?̂?𝑚 
?̂?𝜀𝑖
2 =
1
𝐿1 − 2
∑ (𝑅𝑖𝜏 − ?̂?𝑖 − ?̂?𝑖𝑅𝑚𝜏)
2
𝑇1
𝜏=𝑇0+1
 
where 
?̂?𝑖 =
1
𝐿1
∑ 𝑅𝑖𝜏
𝑇1
𝜏=𝑇0+1
 
and 
?̂?𝑚 =
1
𝐿1
∑ 𝑅𝑚𝜏
𝑇1
𝜏=𝑇0+1
 
𝑅𝑖𝜏 and 𝑅𝑚𝜏 are the return in the event period 𝜏 for security 𝑖 and the market separately.
37
 
 
3.2.4 Define estimation window 
Before measuring and analysing the abnormal returns one first has to define the event time. 
Defining 𝜏 = 0 as the event day, 𝜏 =  𝑇1 + 1 to 𝜏 = 𝑇2 is the event window, and 𝜏 =  𝑇0 + 1 
to 𝜏 = 𝑇1 constitutes the estimation window. Let 𝐿1 = 𝑇1 − 𝑇0 and 𝐿2 = 𝑇2 − 𝑇1 be the length 
of the estimation window and the event window. It is common that the length of the event 
window is larger than one day since you then absorb the abnormal returns that can occur 
around the actual event date. The post-event window is then 𝜏 =  𝑇2 + 1 to 𝜏 =  𝑇3 and the 
length 𝐿3 =  𝑇3 − 𝑇2. The estimation window and the event window should not overlap since 
the parameters of the normal return model would in that case be influenced by the event. The 
model wants to capture the event effects only with the abnormal returns since the model is 
built around that assumption.
38
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Figure 3- Event study 
 
3.2.5 Calculate the abnormal returns 
Using the market model parameters estimates one can now estimate and analyse the abnormal 
returns: 
𝐴?̂?𝑖𝜏 = 𝑅𝑖𝜏 − ?̂?𝑖 − ?̂?𝑖𝑅𝑚𝜏 
𝜎2(𝐴?̂?𝑖𝜏) = 𝜎𝜀𝑖
2 +
1
𝐿1
[1 +
(𝑅𝑚𝜏 − ?̂?𝑚)
2
𝜎𝑚
2 ] 
To draw any conclusion for the event one has to aggregate the abnormal return observations 
through all securities:  
𝐴𝑅𝜏̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ =  
1
𝑁
∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝜏
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
Which is the average abnormal return (AAR) on day τ , with the variance: 
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝐴𝑅𝜏̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) =  
1
𝑁2
∑ 𝜎𝜀𝑖
2
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
The AAR can then be aggregated over any interval within the event window to get the 
average cumulative abnormal return (CAAR) by summing the average abnormal returns over 
a chosen amount of days. 
𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (𝜏1𝜏2) = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝜏̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝜏2
𝜏=𝜏1
 
And the variance for the CAAR is obtained by summing the variance of the AAR: 
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (𝜏1𝜏2)) = ∑ 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝐴𝑅𝜏̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝜏2
𝜏=𝜏1
) 
To test the null hypothesis that the (cumulative) abnormal returns are zero the following test 
is used: 
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𝜃1 =
𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (𝜏1𝜏2)
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (𝜏1𝜏2))
1
2⁄
 ~𝑁(0,1) 
These tests will be done in excel by calculating t-stat and probability values, if the p-value is 
lower than chosen significance (α) the null hypothesis will be rejected.39 
 
3.2.6 Presentation of the empirical results 
Once all the tests are done the results are evaluated. One important aspect to considering 
when assessing the results is the number of observation. If there is, as in this case, a limited 
number of observations in the data set a single observation could have a major impact on the 
outcome. 
 
3.2.7 Analysing the results 
The final step of the event study is to analyse the empirical results and draw conclusions. 
 
3.3 Welch´s t-test to test difference between subgroups  
In some of the hypotheses the study wants to analyse differences between different subgroups 
of the sample. To see whether there is a difference in mean between different groups the 
Welch´s t-test will be used. This test is used when you want to examine differences in mean 
between two groups with unequal sample sizes and unequal variances (or rather when you 
don’t know whether the variances are equal or not). To test the hypothesis of difference in 
mean the following test statistic is calculated: 
𝑡 =
𝑋1 − 𝑋2̅̅ ̅
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
√𝑆1
2
𝑛1
+
𝑆2
2
𝑛2
 
Where S
2
i is the unbiased estimator of the variance for group i and ni is the sample size of 
group i. To determine whether there is a significant difference one needs to calculate the 
degrees of freedom and look up the p-value in a student t-distribution table, however these 
tests will be conducted in Excel using the analysis tool pack where the p-value is attached. 
The p-value is then compared to a chosen significant level to decide if the difference is 
significant.
40
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3.4 Multiple regression (source: introductory econometrics for finance) 
To get a view of what variables might affect the abnormal return and with what magnitude, a 
multiple regression model will be used. The result of the regression model will also be used in 
analysing some of the hypotheses that will be stated later in this chapter. The formula for a 
multiple linear regression model is: 
𝑦 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑥2 + 𝛽3𝑥3 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑘𝑋𝑘 + 𝑢𝑡 
Where the variables x2, x3, ...xk are a set of k-1 explanatory variables that might influence y 
and β1, β2,…βk are the parameters that quantify the effect of each of the x-variables on the 
explained variable y and ut is the disturbance term.
41
 
 
3.4.1 Description of the explanatory variables used in regression 
Relative size of SEO variable is defined as the injected capital (the amount of cash added to 
the company before costs) divided by total market cap at the announcement day. 
 
The variable dilution is a measure on how much the existing owner’s share of the company 
will be diluted (reduced) if they don’t exercise their rights to participate in the SEO. Defined 
as total number of new shares/(total number of new shares+total number of old shares). 
 
The relative cost of the SEO variable is defined as the cost of the SEO divided by the injected 
capital. 
 
The market capitalization variable is the value in MSEK at the announcement day. 
 
The growth firms variable is a dummy-variable where firms conducting the SEO with the 
reason to carry growth opportunities (for example NPV-positive investments) get the number 
one and if not gets the number zero.  
 
The injected capital variable is also measured in MSEK and is the amount of cash the issuing 
firm recieves. 
 
                                                          
41
 Brooks, Chris, Introductory econometrics for finance (2). Cambride University Press. 2002. pp. 88-120   
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3.5 Post-issue abnormal returns  
3.5.1 Calculating the BHAR 
To examine the long-term effect for the firms that have conducted an SEO, buy-and-hold 
abnormal return (BHAR) will be calculated for the firms on a one-year horizon after the 
announcement day. The one-year BHAR is calculated in monthly steps, dividing  the 252 
trading days with twelve months gives 21 observations in each monthly buy-and-hold return 
for each security in the sample. The technique represents a real investor’s return on an 
investment from time 𝑡 to 𝑡 + 1.  
The buy-and-hold returns on firm i is calculated the following way: 
𝐵𝐻𝑅𝑖,𝜏,𝑇 =  [∏(1 + 𝑅𝑖,𝑡) − 1
𝑇
𝑡=𝜏
] ∗ 100% 
 τ to T is the holding period of the security and Ri,t is the return on security i in month t. 
 
To determine the buy-and-hold abnormal return for firm i, the BHAR for a matching 
firm or index has to be subtracted. The number of companies listed in Stockholm is obviously 
less than on many other markets, e.g. London and New York where most of the earlier studies 
been made. Therefore it is more difficult to find matching-firms with the desired properties 
such as similar size and industry, hence the decision is made to use the OMXSPI as the 
matching portfolio for all companies. OMXSPI is a weighted index, containing the 298 
companies listed on the Stockholm stock exchange. The expected BHR of the firm is the buy-
and-hold return on the market portfolio.  
𝐸(𝐵𝐻𝑅𝑖,𝜏,𝑇) =  [∏(1 + 𝑅𝑚,𝑡) − 1
𝑇
𝑡=𝜏
] ∗ 100% 
The buy-and-hold abnormal return on firm I over the holding period is therefore the 
difference between the actual return and the expected: 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝜏,𝑇 =  ∏(1 + 𝑅𝑖,𝑡) −
𝑇
𝑡=𝜏
∏(1 + 𝐸(𝑅𝑖,𝑡))
𝑇
𝑡=𝜏
 
To get the average BHAR over all firms you simply aggregate all BHAR and divide it by the 
number of firms N: 
𝐴𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝜏,𝑇 =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝜏,𝑇
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
   29 
 
3.5.2 Testing the significance of ABHAR 
To test the significance of the average buy-and-hold abnormal return the following test 
statistic is calculated: 
𝑡
𝐴𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝜏,𝑇= 
𝐴𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝜏,𝑇∗√𝑁
𝜎𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝜏,𝑇
 
Where ABHARτ,T  and σBHARi,τ,T is the cross-sectional mean and standard deviation. The 
central limit theorem guarantees that the mean abnormal return converges to normality as the 
sample increases. In addition to test the significance of the ABHAR, the fraction of firms with 
negative ABHAR will be tested. In this test you check whether the fraction of firms with 
negative ABHAR is statistically larger than 0,5, i.e. you want to find out if more than 50% of 
the firms get negative BHAR after one year. This is tested for significance as: 
𝑧 =  
?̂? − 𝑝
√𝑝(1 − 𝑝)/𝑁
 
Where ?̂? is the fraction of the firms with negative BHAR observed in the sample and p is test 
level, 50% in this case. For Np and N(1-p) greater than 5 the test statistics is approximately 
normally distributed. 
42
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 Ngatuni, Proches, Capstaff, John & Marshall, Andrew, “Long-term performance following rights issues and 
open offers in the UK”, Genus: Journal of Business & Accounting 34, no 1, 2007, pp. 33-64 
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4. Results and discussion 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 2- Descriptive statistics 
The table above shows the descriptive statistics for the abnormal returns as well as the 
variables included in the multiple regression model. As we can see in the table the sample 
consists of a wide variety of companies in terms of market value, the biggest company Nordea 
had a market capitalization of more than 140 billion SEK at the time they announced their 
SEO while the smallest company had a value of 101 million SEK. This is obviously a huge 
difference but since the abnormal returns are not value-weighted these companies abnormal 
return will affect the results with equal importance. The mean market cap in the sample is 
around 4,2 billion SEK but the median, which we believe gives a better view of the 
distribution, is roughly 371 million SEK. There is a big difference between these numbers and 
that is because a couple of the largest companies listed in Sweden conducted SEOs during the 
financial crisis, especially large banks as Swedbank, Nordea and SEB which increased the 
mean market capitalization. The median also suggests that it is primarily “smaller” companies 
that conducted SEOs in our period of interest. The same pattern can be seen in the injected 
capital which usually goes hand in hand with the market cap, where the largest SEO issued 
equity for more than 14 billion SEK compared to the smallest issuing coming in at 8,8 million 
SEK. The big differences is not surprising, the need for external capital is bigger for small, 
young companies while larger and more mature companies can rely on its ability to generate 
internal capital in general, yet this is off course not always the case. The abnormal returns will 
be further described and analyzed in the subsequent subchapters. 
 
 
AR(-3) AR(-2) AR(-1) AR(0) AR(1) AR(2) AR(3) CAR(-3;3) CAR(0;1)
N 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99
Mean 0,609% 1,236% 0,464% -1,557% -0,469% 0,716% 0,505% 1,505% -2,004%
Median 0,212% 0,416% 0,182% -0,521% 0,386% -0,190% -0,569% 3,050% 0,081%
Max 14,018% 19,146% 27,954% 25,052% 13,586% 30,328% 31,448% 48,525% 22,537%
Min -8,556% -10,797% -14,698% -47,525% -28,463% -19,000% -28,909% -63,296% -63,370%
Std. Dev. 0,037763701 0,043388423 0,048814476 0,094751641 0,072348965 0,057768682 0,072640186 0,172691475 0,136228
Market cap Injected capital Costs Dilution Relative size of SEO Cost of SEO/Total size BHAR BHAR6M
N 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99
Mean 4210,311717 1104,913773 37,13330822 0,37166311 0,476419065 0,063804626 -0,090130521 -0,095835978
Median 370,97 125 7,5 0,329 0,277273532 0,062368506 -0,135546669 -0,119442233
Max 142745,9 29634,66851 974,4475138 0,975609756 7,396032207 0,16064257 3,468259954 1,372383964
Min 101,38 8,832 0,7 0,058823529 0,050390527 0,005564388 -1,140480818 -0,867891028
Std. Dev. 15865,06154 3709,303163 119,229062 0,223725446 0,823902269 0,035355748 0,589453701 0,377963132
Descriptive statistics
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4.1 Abnormal returns in the estimation window  
The table below shows the results of the event study performed on the 99 firms in the sample. 
The AAR is the average abnormal return for each day in the event window and consequently 
the CAAR is the cumulative average abnormal return over a specified number of days during 
the event window. A total of 10 tests (one for each day within the event window and 3 
different CAAR-tests) were conducted, with the method described in the previous chapter. As 
can be seen in the table, two of the tests resulted in significant abnormal returns, the abnormal 
return on the announcement day and the cumulative abnormal return over the announcement 
day and the day after. Apart from the significant results we can see that all the other tests get 
high p-values, far from being significant except for the day after the announcement. 
Especially the days prior the announcement day shows relatively high returns and if we would 
test the opposite hypothesis, i.e. test if AAR is larger than zero we would actually find that the 
AAR two days prior to the announcement day has a statistically significant positive abnormal 
returns. 
 
Table 3- (C)AAR´s test for significance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TEST ( C)AAR(t) Variance t-stat P-value Significant Significance
Mean (AR(-3)) 0,006079957 1,72432E-05 1,464172039 0,928426526 NO -
Mean (AR(-2)) 0,012363558 1,72432E-05 2,977385762 0,99854641 NO -
Mean (AR(-1)) 0,00483213 1,72432E-05 1,163671022 0,877721321 NO -
Mean (AR(0)) -0,015455352 1,72432E-05 -3,721949874 9,88451E-05 YES ***
Mean (AR(1)) -0,004581232 1,72432E-05 -1,103249818 0,134959346 NO -
Mean (AR(2)) 0,006228881 1,72432E-05 1,500035952 0,933197455 NO -
Mean (AR(3)) 0,004962226 1,72432E-05 1,19500079 0,883956639 NO -
Mean(CAR(-3;3)) 0,014430169 0,000120702 1,313451441 0,905484563 NO -
Mean (CAR(-1;3)) -0,004013346 8,62158E-05 -0,43222833 0,332787735 NO -
Mean (CAR(0;1)) -0,020036584 3,44863E-05 -3,411931423 0,000322522 YES ***
Significance test for negative CAAR and AAR
H0: AAR = 0, H1: AAR < 0
Source: Calculations done in Excel with data from Thomson Datasatream
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4.2 BHAR long term  
The figure below confirms the prediction that the issuing firms would perform worse than the 
index which is in line with previous studies. The issuing firms share price experience 
significant drops during the eight months following the event and then make a sound recovery 
at the end of the year as the benchmark firms are on steady growth throughout the year. 
However, the firms’ performance was not significantly different from the benchmark for the 
12 months abnormal returns, but by only examining the first 6 months the results were 
different. The average BHAR is about the same for the 6-months respectively 12-months 
period but since the standard deviations is smaller for the 6-months period we find it to be 
statistically significant. The results from these tests can be found in the appendix. 
 
 
Figure 5- Performance during 1 year past the announcement 
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 Figure 4 - Average abnormal returns over event window 
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4.3 Large vs small firms  
As we stated earlier in hypothesis 3 we wanted to see if we could find any differences 
between large and small firms. We define large firms as firms with a market cap larger than 
500 MSEK and the other firms in our sample were considered small. The graphs below show 
the abnormal returns in the event window. In the first graph you can observe the average 
abnormal returns for the different days. The returns of the two subgroups are here positive 
prior to day zero, negative for the small firms and positive for the large firms during day zero 
and day one, and positive for the small firms and negative for the large firms for day two and 
day three. The largest different between the subgroups is during the announcement day where 
the average abnormal return is about -3% for the small firms compared to slightly above 0% 
for the larger firms. In the second graph we observe the cumulative average abnormal returns.  
The largest difference between the subgroups is for the day after the announcement day where 
small firms have a cumulative abnormal return of -1.0% compared to 1.8% for large firms. 
We ran tests for both the large and the small firms. There are no significant average abnormal 
returns or significant cumulative average abnormal returns for the large firms. However, for 
the smaller firms, the negative average abnormal return was significant for the announcement 
day. We also tested a shorter event window consisting of day zero and day one and found 
significant cumulative average abnormal returns, also for the smaller firms. A Welch test was 
conducted to test if there is a significant difference between the groups. The test shows that 
there is a significant difference between the groups on the announcement day. All of the 
material can be found in the appendix.  
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Figure 6- AAR over event window small vs large firms 
 
 
Figure 7- CAAR over event window small vs large firms 
 
4.4 Effect of dilution and cost of SEO 
To investigate hypothesis 4 and 5 a multiple regression model has been conducted, the results 
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capital), and thus we will not use this model. Instead model 4 was preferred, the residuals has 
been checked for normality and heteroskedasticity with the Jarque-Bera test respectively the 
Breusch-Pagan test and passed booth.  
In the hypothesis-section we described that we wanted to find out whether the cost 
associated with the SEO and the dilution has an impact on the firm’s stock return. The 
regression shows that the cost of the SEO and the dilution effect has a negative impact on the 
BHAR, however neither of these two was statistically significant and thus one should be 
careful in draw any conclusions from these results. 
 
4.5 Growth vs Survival  
The two graphs below present the results of the abnormal returns during the event window for 
growth firms and survival firms. The first graph show that for both subgroups, the average 
abnormal returns are positive for the days prior to the event and negative for day zero. The 
growth firms average abnormal returns then continue to be negative following the event 
whereas the survival firms average abnormal returns are positive. The results are only 
significant for the announcement day of growth firms. This contradicts the hypothesis and 
instead suggests that firms that issue capital for growth opportunities have a larger negative 
abnormal return at the announcement day than firms that issued capital mainly for survival. 
However there was no statistical difference between the two subgroups. 
The second graph shows the cumulative abnormal returns over the event window. The 
growth firms have a negative cumulative abnormal return and the survival firms have a 
positive cumulative abnormal return, however none of them showing statistical significance. 
We also tested the shorter event window consisting of day zero and day one, and found 
significant negative cumulative abnormal returns for both groups. The significance level was 
higher for the growth firms which also contradict the hypothesis but a t-test proved no 
statistical difference between the subgroups. The tests can be found in the appendix. 
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Figure 8- Average abnormal returns Growth vs Survival 
 
Figure 9- cumulative abnormal return Growth vs Survival 
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4.6 Discussion 
Our expectations before we got the results of the abnormal returns, was that firms that 
conduct a SEO would suffer from negative abnormal return on the announcement day. This 
assumption was based on previous research made by other authors, looking at the table in the 
theory chapter we see that both Walker&Yost (2008) and Asquith&Mullins (1986) found 
negative AAR’s at the announcement day. As we have mentioned before and which can be 
seen in table 3 we can now confirm our assumptions, we found statistically significant 
negative AAR on the announcement day and cumulated over two days, which is consistent 
with previous research. Even though there is a negative AAR over day zero and day one it’s 
important to point out that the overall performance over the event window actually is positive, 
however not significant.  
It seems like the stock price perform better than it should during the three days prior the 
announcement and the last two days within the event window, but none of these days gives 
any significant result and therefore we shouldn’t draw any conclusions based on that. So how 
can these findings be described theoretically? Well according to the literature, these findings 
are expected. The pecking order theory says that if a company needs external financing 
issuing new equity is the least preferred method and if the firm has any other alternatives that 
alternative should be chosen. When the firms announces a SEO they show weakness, even 
though the proceedings may be used to finance NPV-positive investment opportunities, 
issuing equity for this purpose signals the market that the firm is unable to generate sufficient 
internal capital. These findings also support the cash flow signaling hypothesis, since it states 
that an unexpected announcement of the need for new issued equity send negative signals to 
the market and thus lead to negative abnormal returns. 
This also suggests that the world of information asymmetry is real and many researchers 
believe that it is the main explanation of the abnormal returns around announcement days. 
Assuming that the information asymmetry is larger between management and shareholders for 
smaller firms, the results also give further evidence of this explanation. The explanation for 
that the smaller firms’ experience a larger negative reaction in the share price might be that 
they are simply less analyzed by the market, and thus the market has not discounted the SEO 
in the share price until it is actually announced. For larger firms on the other hand the market 
already knows the financial status of the company and opposed to the small firms it is already 
discounted, and the negative reaction does not appear in the same magnitude. In this sample, 
smaller firms have larger negative abnormal returns around the announcement day than the 
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larger firms which prove this point. These findings reject the efficient market hypothesis, it 
seems like the market fails to accurately value smaller companies. 
The post-announcement-day results showed that the sample firms performed 
significantly worse than matching portfolio for a six months period of time following the 
announcement day. About 67% of the firms displayed negative BHAR’s in the 12-months 
period post the announcement which is close to the 63% that Ngatuni et.al found in their 
study from 2006 on firms from the United Kingdom.  
In hypothesis six we wanted to analyze whether firms that issues equity primarily for 
growth reasons performed significantly better than those made for survival of the firm. When 
creating this hypothesis our first thought was that growth-firms should perform better, but 
analyzing the results we found that growth-firms actually performed worse than the others, 
however no significant difference between the groups can be statistically proved. This rather 
unexpected result gives support to The existing asset value signaling hypothesis based on the 
article by Myers&Majluf in 1984 that says that the announcement of a SEO gives a negative 
reaction, and the purpose of the injected capital does not affect the magnitude of the reaction. 
Neither dilution effects nor injected capital can explain the buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns for the six months periods or the twelve months period. These results point toward that 
whether the company issues large amounts of shares or have large floatation costs around the 
issue does not matter in terms of performance in the post-announcement-day-period. Having 
in mind that we are researching rights issues could also be explaining the insignificant results 
regarding the dilution, since rights offering gives the stockholder the right to defend his share 
in the company, and thus will not have his total share of the company diluted if he participate 
in the SEO.    
 
Figure 10- AAR and CAAR over event window all firms 
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5. Conclusion 
In this thesis we examined rights offerings on the Swedish market between the years of 2007-
2013. We hypothesized that rights offerings will have a negative impact around the 
announcement day and consequently lead to lower the share price. We found support for this 
view, the smaller companies in the sample showed significant abnormal returns during the 
announcement day and the day after. We also found support for our second hypothesis, the 
sample performed significantly worse than the benchmark firms for six months following the 
event. We did not find support for our explanatory variables issue costs, dilution, growth and 
survival but found a relationship between the injected capital and the BHAR.  
That we observed abnormal returns for the smaller companies was with respect to the 
literature a satisfying result and gives further evidence to the theories and literature described 
earlier. We argue that these firms have relatively higher information asymmetry and therefore 
the market adjust accordingly to the given information about issuing equity. The negative 
long run effects was in line with previous research however they could also be explained by 
the fact that rights offerings should lower the share price all other things equal. Whether there 
was a share price drop exactly when the equity was issued was not investigated, but the 
abnormal returns continue for at least six months after the announcement, indicating that the 
share price is in a negative trend.  
From an investor´s point of view the rational behavior would be to short the small firms 
at the announcement day, however without having inside information it is obviously 
impossible to know what day the SEO will be announced. What we can say and what 
investors can use in their investment strategy, is that a significant proportion of the firms 
experience an abnormal negative return the months after a SEO announcement and therefore 
investing in these stocks would not be recommended. 
To conclude, the purpose with this thesis was to analyze the behavior of firm value for 
Swedish firms conducting SEOs and to compare it to previous research done in other 
countries. What we found was nothing that deviates a lot from what has already been shown 
before and therefore our results confirms the prevailing consensus, that the firms announcing 
a SEO does on average experience a negative abnormal return. Our findings do also support 
the most well-known theories and literature that cover equity offerings.    
In a corporate finance view, the capital restructure along with an issuance have a 
damaging effect on the share price in the Swedish market. However, since we only 
investigated twelve months following the event, we cannot discourage companies to forego 
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with such plans. The firms could be on the verge of producing first class services or finding 
great new investments yet to be discovered by the market, also due to high levels of 
information asymmetry. Using the share price as a proxy for success is not necessarily always 
the case. 
 
6. Additional comments 
Further research in the subject of SEOs on the Swedish market is necessary for one to draw 
decisive conclusions. We investigated in the abnormal returns around the announcement day 
of the SEO, however previous studies have also focused on the subscription period of SEOs, 
this period might have significant effects on our post-announcement-day period returns since 
the subscription event is included in that period. The abnormal returns could also be 
recalculated and corrected for the expected drop in share price that involves in rights issues. 
The results from such research would give additional depth to conclude what actually happens 
when a firm decides to issue new shares.  
We tested a number of explanatory variables but of no significant value. Other 
explanatory variables such as market-to-book, price/earnings-ratios or other key figures might 
have a greater influence on the expectations of the market.  
We would also like to advise further researchers to categorize the companies to a greater 
extent, through industry type and maybe even within the industry depending on the company 
specific qualities. 
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8. Appendix 
8.1 Buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ABHAR St.Dev. N t-stat P-value Significant
-9,01% 0,589454 99 -1,52139 6,41% No
H0: ABHAR = 0, H1: ABHAR < 0
α=5%
Testing the average buy-and-hold abnormal return (1year)
ABHAR St.Dev. N t-stat P-value Significant
-0,09584 0,377963 99 -2,52288 0,58% Yes
H0: ABHAR = 0, H1: ABHAR < 0
α=5%
Testing the average buy-and-hold abnormal return (6 months)
Negative BHAR N t-stat P-value Significant
66,67% 99 3,316625 0,05% Yes
H0: # of BHAR = 50%, H1: # of BHAR > 50%
α=5%
Testing if number of negative BHAR exceed 50%
   45 
 
8.2 Large vs. Small firms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LARGE FIRMS
DAY ( C )AAR(t) Variance T-stat P-value Significant Significance
Mean (AR(-3)) 0,001761 0,000025 0,353785 63,83% NO -
Mean (AR(-2)) 0,012325 0,000025 2,476201 99,34% NO -
Mean (AR(-1)) 0,001548 0,000025 0,310944 62,21% NO -
Mean (AR(0)) 0,001669 0,000025 0,335385 63,13% NO -
Mean (AR(1)) 0,001159 0,000025 0,232764 59,20% NO -
Mean (AR(2)) -0,002214 0,000025 -0,444811 32,82% NO -
Mean (AR(3)) -0,007664 0,000025 -1,539706 6,18% NO -
Mean(CAR(-3;3)) 0,008584 0,000173 0,651823 74,27% NO -
Mean (CAR(0;1)) -0,006837741 4,95475E-05 -0,971408299 0,165672499 NO -
H0:(C)AAR = 0, H1: (C)AAR < 0
N = 44
Source: Calculations done in Excel with data from Thomson Datasatream
SMALL FIRMS
DAY ( C )AAR(t) Variance T-stat P-value Significant Significance
Mean (AR(-3)) 0,009561 0,000040 1,511412 93,47% NO -
Mean (AR(-2)) 0,012394 0,000040 1,959388 97,50% NO -
Mean (AR(-1)) 0,007106 0,000040 1,123446 86,94% NO -
Mean (AR(0)) -0,029360 0,000040 -4,641540 0,00% YES ***
Mean (AR(1)) -0,009377 0,000040 -1,482415 6,91% NO -
Mean (AR(2)) 0,014664 0,000040 2,318214 98,98% NO -
Mean (AR(3)) 0,015226 0,000040 2,407116 99,20% NO -
Mean(CAR(-3;3)) 0,020214 0,000280 1,207831 88,64% NO -
Mean (CAR(0;1)) -0,030595658 8,00253E-05 -3,420158634 0,03% YES ***
H0: (C)AAR = 0, H1: (C)AAR < 0
N = 55
Source: Calculations done in Excel with data from Thomson Datasatream
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8.3 Growth vs. Survival 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GROWTH FIRMS
DAY (C)AAR(t) Variance T-stat P-value Significant Significance
Mean (AR(-3)) 0,002634764 2,972E-05 0,4832783 0,6855509 NO -
Mean (AR(-2)) 0,015973501 2,972E-05 2,9299197 0,9983048 NO -
Mean (AR(-1)) 0,006896185 2,972E-05 1,2649242 0,8970508 NO -
Mean (AR(0)) -0,026451748 2,972E-05 -4,8518791 6,115E-07 YES ***
Mean (AR(1)) 0,000163407 2,972E-05 0,0299728 0,5119556 NO -
Mean (AR(2)) -0,006195 2,972E-05 -1,1363102 0,1279134 NO -
Mean (AR(3)) -0,006235208 2,972E-05 -1,1436852 0,1263771 NO -
Mean(CAR(-3;3)) -0,013214098 0,0002081 -0,9161025 0,1798066 NO -
Mean (CAR(0;1)) -0,02808259 5,945E-05 -3,6423171 0,0001351 YES ***
H0: (C)AAR = 0, H1: (C)AAR < 0
N = 40
Source: Calculations done in Excel with data from Thomson Datasatream
SURVIVAL FIRMS
DAY (C)AAR(t) Variance T-stat P-value Significant Significance
Mean (AR(-3)) 0,008439281 3,489E-05 1,4287946 0,9234684 NO -
Mean (AR(-2)) 0,009915854 3,489E-05 1,6787827 0,9534028 NO -
Mean (AR(-1)) 0,003103438 3,489E-05 0,5254209 0,7003547 NO -
Mean (AR(0)) -0,008191478 3,489E-05 -1,3868408 0,0827452 NO -
Mean (AR(1)) -0,007988147 3,489E-05 -1,3524162 0,0881211 NO -
Mean (AR(2)) 0,016218723 3,489E-05 2,7458766 0,9969825 NO -
Mean (AR(3)) 0,012706072 3,489E-05 2,1511746 0,9842688 NO -
Mean(CAR(-3;3)) 0,034203744 0,0002442 2,1887138 0,9856912 NO -
Mean (CAR(0;1)) -0,014581664 6,978E-05 -1,7456471 0,0404361 YES *
H0: (C)AAR = 0, H1: (C)AAR < 0
N = 40
Source: Calculations done in Excel with data from Thomson Datasatream
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8.4 Not included companies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Companies not included due to low market cap at announcement day (>100MSEK)
CHERRYFÖRETAGEN AB ALLENEX AB
PANAXIA AB KOPY GOLDFIELDS AB
VINOVO AB EXINI DIAGNOSTICS AKTIEBOLAG
PILUM AB POLYPLANK AKTIEBOLAG
AXLON GROUP MIRIS HOLDING AB
CREATIVE ANTIBIOTICS SWEDEN AB RW CAPITAL AKTIEBOLAG
ALLTELE ALLMÄNNA SVENSKA TELEFONAKTIEBOL SEANET MARITIME COMMUNICATIONS AKTIEBOLA
ACCELERATOR I LINKÖPING AB IDL BIOTECH AB
EPISURF MEDICAL AB MULTIQ INTERNATIONAL AB
BIOSENSOR APPLICATIONS SWEDEN AB CRYPTZONE GROUP AB
PAYNOVA AB GENOVIS AB
ARTIMPLANT AB SWITCHCORE AB
MINERAL INVEST INTERNATIONAL MII AB SEANET MARITIME COMMUNICATIONS AKTIEBOLA
SMARTEQ AB PARADOX ENTERTAINMENT AB
HEART OF BRANDS AB ORASOLV AB
STARBREEZE AB CONFIDENCE INTERNATIONAL AKTIEBOLAG
CYBAERO AB CYBAERO AB
DEFLAMO AB ORASOLV AB
RAYCLINIC AB IMAGE SYSTEMS AB
WESC AB CONFIDENCE INTERNATIONAL AKTIEBOLAG
ISCONOVA AKTIEBOLAG AIK FOTBOLL AB
PILUM AB NGS GROUP AKTIEBOLAG
BERGS TIMBER AB NGS GROUP AKTIEBOLAG
BREDBAND2 I SKANDINAVIEN AB ECO SUPPLIES EUROPE AB
DIGITAL VISION AKTIEBOLAG CHALLENGER MOBILE AB
TAGMASTER AKTIEBOLAG AVTECH SWEDEN AB
SMARTEQ AB Forestlight Studio AB (publ)
HANSA MEDICAL AB BIOLIGHT INTERNATIONAL AKTIEBOLAG
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8.5 Excluded companies 
 
 
 
Excluded companies due to other reasons (offering type, data missing, 2 years between SEO´s etc.)
FORTNOX INTERNATIONAL AB GUIDELINE OIL DRILLING TECHNOLOGY AB
GETUPDATED INTERNET MARKETING AB GENOVIS AB
GETUPDATED INTERNET MARKETING AB COUNTERMINE TECHNOLOGIES AB
CHEMEL AKTIEBOLAG FINGERPRINT CARDS AB
MOBYSON AB GENOVIS AB
CHEMEL AKTIEBOLAG LIFEASSAYS AB
CHEMEL AKTIEBOLAG LIGHTLAB SWEDEN AB
TRIPEP AB CHRONTECH PHARMA AB
GETUPDATED INTERNET MARKETING AB SMARTEQ AB
GETUPDATED INTERNET MARKETING AB FOLLOWIT HOLDING AKTIEBOLAG
SHARPVIEW AB HQ AB
Forestlight Studio AB (publ) LIFEASSAYS AB
LIGHTLAB SWEDEN AB CHRONTECH PHARMA AB
TELIGENT AKTIEBOLAG A-COM AB
NORDIC MINES AB LIGHTLAB SWEDEN AB
SAS AB GENOVIS AB
ENIRO AB A-COM AB
ACTIVE BIOTECH AB CRYPTZONE AB
ACTIVE BIOTECH AB PILUM AB
ACTIVE BIOTECH AB LABS2 GROUP AB
OASMIA PHARMACEUTICAL AB LIGHTLAB SWEDEN AB
KAPPAHL AB BOTNIA EXPLORATION HOLDING AB
RNB RETAIL AND BRANDS AB FOLLOWIT HOLDING AKTIEBOLAG
CYBERCOM GROUP EUROPE AB CHEMEL AKTIEBOLAG
KARO BIO AKTIEBOLAG COUNTERMINE TECHNOLOGIES AB
NEUROVIVE PHARMACEUTICAL AB PRECOMP SOLUTIONS AKTIEBOLAG
NORDIC MINES AB LIFEASSAYS AB
KARO BIO AKTIEBOLAG LIFEASSAYS AB
CYBERCOM GROUP EUROPE AB CONFIDENCE INTERNATIONAL AKTIEBOLAG
PRECISE BIOMETRICS AB CRYPTZONE AB
ACCELERATOR NORDIC AB CRYPTZONE AB
RUSFOREST AB PRECOMP SOLUTIONS AKTIEBOLAG
BIOSENSOR APPLICATIONS SWEDEN AB BIOSENSOR APPLICATIONS SWEDEN AB
PRECISE BIOMETRICS AB OPCON AKTIEBOLAG
PRECISE BIOMETRICS AB LIFEASSAYS AB
INVISIO COMMUNICATIONS AB Flästa Källa AB
GUIDELINE OIL DRILLING TECHNOLOGY AB GENOVIS AB
BIOINVENT INTERNATIONAL AB GETUPDATED INTERNET MARKETING AB
OPCON AKTIEBOLAG FASTIGHETS AB BALDER
RUSFOREST AB COT-CLEAN OIL TECHNOLOGY AB
ACCELERATOR NORDIC AB REDERI AB TRANSATLANTIC
FINGERPRINT CARDS AB KILSTA METALLVÄRDEN AB
BIOSENSOR APPLICATIONS SWEDEN AB Trigon Agri A/S
ELLEN AKTIEBOLAG PAYNOVA AB
LIFEASSAYS AB TAURUS ENERGY AKTIEBOLAG
GENOVIS AB DIAMYD MEDICAL AKTIEBOLAG
ELLEN AKTIEBOLAG MORPHIC TECHNOLOGIES AB
LABS2 GROUP AB COUNTERMINE TECHNOLOGIES AB
LIFEASSAYS AB SMARTEQ AB
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8.6 Welch´s test for difference between Growth and Survival 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Test Difference in CAAR between Growth and Survival
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances
Growth Survival
Mean -0,0132141 0,034204
Variance 0,01370214 0,040252
Observations 40 59
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0
df 95
t Stat -1,48123764
P(T<=t) one-tail 0,070926249
t Critical one-tail 1,661051817
P(T<=t) two-tail 0,141852498
t Critical two-tail 1,985251004
H0: No difference in mean
Test: Difference in CAAR(0;1) between Growth and Survival
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances
Variable 1 Variable 2
Mean -0,02808259 -0,01458
Variance 0,014914116 0,021253
Observations 40 59
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0
df 93
t Stat -0,49864079
P(T<=t) one-tail 0,309604903
t Critical one-tail 1,661403674
P(T<=t) two-tail 0,619209806
t Critical two-tail 1,985801814
H0: No difference in mean
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8.7 Welch´s test for difference between Large and Small firms 
 
Test: Difference in AAR(0) between Growth and Survival
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances
Growth Survival
Mean -0,02645175 -0,00819
Variance 0,007880617 0,009733
Observations 40 59
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0
df 89
t Stat -0,95975334
P(T<=t) one-tail 0,169889752
t Critical one-tail 1,662155326
P(T<=t) two-tail 0,339779504
t Critical two-tail 1,9869787
H0: No difference in mean
Test for differences in AAR(0) between large and small firms
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances
Large firms Small Firms
Mean 0,001669318 -0,02936031
Variance 0,00458947 0,012202747
Observations 44 55
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0
df 91
t Stat 1,718113039
P(T<=t) one-tail 0,044588426
t Critical one-tail 1,661771155
P(T<=t) two-tail 0,089176853
t Critical two-tail 1,986377154
H0: No difference in mean
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Test for differences in CAAR between large and small firms
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances
Large firms Small firms
Mean 0,008583705 0,020214073
Variance 0,023910709 0,035020795
Observations 44 55
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0
df 97
t Stat -0,33854916
P(T<=t) one-tail 0,367840556
t Critical one-tail 1,66071461
P(T<=t) two-tail 0,735681111
t Critical two-tail 1,984723186
H0: No difference in mean
Test for differences in CAAR(0;1) between large and small firms
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances
Large firms Small firms
Mean -0,006837741 -0,03059566
Variance 0,012589671 0,023398892
Observations 44 55
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0
df 96
t Stat 0,890638774
P(T<=t) one-tail 0,187674833
t Critical one-tail 1,66088144
P(T<=t) two-tail 0,375349666
t Critical two-tail 1,984984312
H0: No difference in mean
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8.8 Multiple regression 
 
Correlation matrix  
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Dependent variable
BHAR6M BHAR6M BHAR6M BHAR6M
Independent variables
Variable Constant Constant Constant Constant
Coef (P-value) 0.097352 (0,4356) 0,061409 (0,6270) 0.088681 (0,3873) 0.096275 (0,3335)
Variable Cost of SEO/Size of SEOCost of SEO/Size of SEOCost of SEO/Size of SEO Cost of SEO/Size of SEO
Coef (P-value) -1.953745 (0,0735) -1.9187 (0,0850) -2.022732 (0,0595) -2.049710 (0,0547)
Variable Dilution Dilution Dilution Dilution
Coef (P-value) -0.294185 (0,1599) -0,176357 (0,3922) -0.198278 (0,3128) -0.241317 (0,1383)
Variable Injected capital Injected capital Injected capital Injected capital
Coef (P-value) 8.35E-05 (0,0032**) 2.61E-05 (0,0129*) 2.55E-05 (0,0134*) 2.57E-05 (0,0125*)
Variable Relative size of SEO Relative size of SEO Relative size of SEO
Coef (P-value) -0.021104 (0,6863) -0,021238 (0,6906) -0.020914 (0,6937)
Variable Dummy Growth Dummy Growth
Coef (P-value) 0.046545 (0,5603) 0,029790 (0,7138)
Variable Market cap
Coef (P-value) -1.43E-05 (0,0274)
R2: 0.185373 0.140903 0.139652 0.138224
Adj R2: 0.132246 0.094715 0.103042 0.111010
Prob(F-stat) 0.003743 0.013545 0.006433 0.002639
DILUTION INJECTED_CAPITAL MARKET_CAP RELATIVE_SIZE_OF_SEO COST_OF_SEO_TOTAL_SIZE DUMMY_GROWTH
DILUTION 1,0000
INJECTED_CAPITAL 0,0832 1,0000
MARKET_CAP -0,0496 0,9269 1,0000
RELATIVE_SIZE_OF_SEO 0,5550 0,0012 -0,0696 1,0000
COST_OF_SEO_TOTAL_SIZE -0,0223 -0,2570 -0,2517 0,0509 1,0000
DUMMY_GROWTH -0,3297 -0,1028 -0,0208 -0,1800 -0,2060 1,0000
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Heteroskedasticity test for model 4
Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey
F-statistic 2.022136     Prob. F(3,95) 0.1160
Obs*R-squared 5.942373     Prob. Chi-Square(3) 0.1144
Scaled explained SS 7.266530     Prob. Chi-Square(3) 0.0639
Test Equation:
Dependent Variable: RESID^2
Method: Least Squares
Date: 05/21/15   Time: 16:57
Sample: 1 99
Included observations: 99
Variable CoefficientStd. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.107537 0.054632 1.968366 0.0519
COST_OF_SEO_TOTAL_SIZE-0.372874 0.581132 -0.641634 0.5227
DILUTION 0.070667 0.089061 0.793468 0.4295
INJECTED_CAPITAL 1.07E-05 5.56E-06 1.930973 0.0565
R-squared 0.060024     Mean dependent var 0.121866
Adjusted R-squared 0.030341     S.D. dependent var 0.199618
S.E. of regression 0.196566     Akaike info criterion -0.376072
Sum squared resid 3.670626     Schwarz criterion -0.271219
Log likelihood 22.61558     Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.333649
F-statistic 2.022136     Durbin-Watson stat 1.270365
Prob(F-statistic) 0.116009
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8.9 Descriptive statistics for variables 
 
N Mean Median St. Dev. Min Max
99 0,4764191 0,2772735 0,8239023 0,0503905 7,3960322
N Mean Median St. Dev. Min Max
99 4210,3117 370,97 15865,062 101,38 142745,9
N Mean Median St. Dev. Min Max
99 0,3716631 0,329 0,2237254 0,0588235 0,9756098
N Mean Median St. Dev. Min Max
99 0,0638046 0,0623685 0,0353557 0,0055644 0,1606426
Relative size of SEO
Market cap
Dilution
Relative cost of SEO
